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2INTRODUCTION: PART I
I  see  art  as  a  means  to  think  through  difficult  ideas  and  curiosities  and  their 
representation does not necessarily reveal this, nor does it need to. Art does not always 
have to mean something. There is a statement by surrealist artist Giorgio de Chirico that 
I  found fascinating throughout the development of my portfolio.  In  the artist's  short 
texts, de Chirico depicts the world as 'an immense museum of strangeness,' to reveal the 
'mystery in insignificant things.'1 He believes that  'Art is the fatal  net which catches 
these strange moments,' and further, he says these moments are not dreams but rather a 
living reality.2  My portfolio is a collection of these strange moments and this thesis a 
reflection upon the process and experience of attempting to collect what is but a living 
reality.   My project involves using art to navigate difficulty,  to map out process and 
progress, narration and the uncanny. The time of this portfolio is a strange reality and 
my process is its mapping and re-mapping. What you see and hear are the traces of a 
journey through wormholes trying to find my way home, only to find the unhomely. 
1  Giorgio de Chirico, in Marcel Jean (ed.), The Autobiography of Surrealism (New York, 1980), 6.
2  Giorgio de Chirco, 'On Metaphysical Art' (1919), in Herschel B. Chipp (ed.), Theories of Modern Art 
(Berkeley, 1969), 448. 
3INTRODUCTION: PART II
My portfolio comprises two projects:  Chicken and  Worm.  For examination purposes, 
these projects are represented as an online portfolio at claireeleanorhealy.com/mysub. 
On this site, Chicken is quite directly a documentation of an event-work, whereas Worm 
attempts to have a separate existence online; it is a documentation of events that invites 
the viewer-listener to reenact some of those events. 
Chicken is a work that was installed at the Old Hairdressers on 27th May 2012 as part 
an event I  organised called ANACOLUTHON (see Figure 2 and 3). For this work I 
programmed  the  data  received  from an  Arduino  micro  controller  and  four  distance 
sensors using Pure Data to produce a large-scale theremin effect. The sound field is 
visually represented by a black sheet that is suspended above the audience/participants. 
It is interactive in that when someone reaches up to touch the material they move closer 
to the sensors and thus change the sound frequencies of the field. In addition to this, 
during the event a recording is played made specifically for the installation, and I wear a 
suction cup microphone on my chest which picks up my beating heart and other bodily 
sounds. 
Worm is a work that focuses on process. It took shape as a film and sound work that 
traces a journey but does not allow access to specific locations. It is made up of field 
recordings that are chopped and rearranged, and photographic images of travel. There 
are four films in total, each with their own 'soundtrack.' These films are found on the 
portfolio website amongst static black and white images of Google Maps exported from 
the  Global Positioning System device I had with me which mapped this journey (See 
4Figure 1 and 4). Worm plays on the notion of truthful documentation by presenting the 
viewer-listener with a confusing diary of events; the act of documenting a journey is at 
once a personal reflection and a estranged fiction. 
5INTRODUCTION: PART III
Chicken is an attempt to force the physicality of the installation space upon the viewer-
listener; to make it immanent and to bring closer that which hangs above our heads. 
Indeed, the namesake of this work is Chicken Licken - the young chick who claims 'the 
sky is falling down!' This children's tale is about the fear of a collapsing space above 
our heads - the sky threatens to suffocate though it  is  made of air.  Chicken Licken 
provokes mass hysteria among the other animals, afflicting others with his illness. The 
remoteness of the sky keeps it  safe, faint, and distantly relevant. Just as our beating 
heart  affirms our living existence,  the sounds in the air confirm our place on earth, 
locating that existence in place; beneath sky. The hanging sheet functions to force the 
audience/participants  to  look  up  and  reevaluate  the  space  of  the  sky.  The 
audience/participants  are  forced  in  this  way through  curiosity  in  the  source  of  the 
sounds.  The  imposing  sheet  becomes  the  focus  of  the  installation  space  and  when 
someone reaches towards it,  that person notices an effect in the sound emitted. It  is 
massive, tech-heavy, and yet delicate and temperamental. Its function is dependent upon 
an audience and a space as it requires participants to complete the sounds and the full 
installation experience. 
The noisy black sheet which tempts the intrusion of the sky is accompanied by another 
wave of sound created from field recordings of church bells and other sounds of the out-
of-touch realm of the sky. Indeed this work was approached mindful of  Martin Dixon's 
essay 'Dwelling and the Sacralisation of the Air: A note on acousmatic music.'3 In this 
Dixon makes reference to Alain Corbain's book,  Les cloches de la terre,  in which he 
3  Martin Dixon,  'Dwelling and the Sacralisation of the Air: A note on acousmatic music,' Organised 
Sound 16(2), Cambridge University Press, 2011, 115-119.
6tells of the importance of the parish bell in nineteenth-century France. Corbain says it 
'anchored localism, imparting depth to the desire for rootedness and offering the peace 
of near, well-defined horizons.'4 I will later discuss Dixon's reading which references 
Martin Heidegger's notion of dwelling, but first I will talk about the context of bells and 
gongs for this project. I have always had an interest in these sonic qualities specifically, 
I think, due to my time spent as a member of a Gamelan orchestra. The room where we 
practiced was in a church that sat at one of highest points of the city, so that the ringing 
could be heard all around. It was common to find walkers tilting their heads upwards 
trying to locate a source of  this usual  noise (usual  for  Cork at  least).  To make the 
recordings for  Chicken,   I was humbly entertained by the Guild of Bellringers at  St 
Mary's Cathedral in Glasgow - a curious ensemble who are very proud of their ten bell 
peal.  While  bemused   locals  wondered  what  all  the  fuss  was  about  ('A wedding, 
perhaps?'), I had the chance to climb up the tower to the Guild's practice session to 
understand the famous peal and take some recordings. Of course, I also got to put faces 
and  personalities  to  these  mysterious  ringers  and  their  song.  In  a  way,  I  find  such 
experiences of common but unknown sounds such as bells and gongs in any city feels 
like being a part of a secret club. 
In the process of making Worm I began to think more deeply about objecthood and the 
performance of a 'self' and a kind of meshing of time and space. To explain, while in 
'performance mode,' I began to rethink the place of the audience and my awareness of 
measured 'stage' times. It  was this thought process that changed the end result of the 
work.  Initially,  Worm was conceived to be a traveling installation with each iteration 
taking the  form of  a  dialogue.  I  was to stage  a conversation of  sorts  based on my 
4  Alain Corbain, Village Bells: Sounds and Meaning in the French Countryside, trans. Martin Thom 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1998),  97. 
7surroundings, and play back recorded material from previous conversations and attempt 
a response. I planned to map out a journey by land and sea starting in Glasgow and 
stopping in London, Paris, Treignac, Rotterdam, Dublin and Cork.5 However, when it 
came to staging the first installation of  Worm, a number of problems arose. One issue 
was my unintended audience - in train stations, parks, urban streets, and under heavy 
surveillance at boarder controls. My announcement as artist to 'begin' and 'end' seemed 
at odds with the fluidity of travel and of objects more generally. Using walkie-talkies 
and other recording devices dispersed in my desired location, my dialogue with myself 
and my environment seemed false. Justifying my presence on a 'stage' interfered with 
any meaningful engagement with sonic material. Demarcating my presence as an artist 
seemed to  overwhelm my capacity to listen and respond. While these conversations 
were initially expected to be challenging in that the ambient sounds would interact with 
the  recordings,  causing  difficulty  in  understanding  the  spoken  words  of  my 
interlocutors, I had not anticipated my experience of insincerity and stuttered, measured 
time. As I continued my journey I reformulated the project into something much more 
fluent and continuous as it was mapped and documented and re-recorded and re-shaped.
The project  is  now made up of layers  of  inquiry rather than snapshots of a passing 
reality; the listener hears bits of conversation, some questions, and some answers. There 
is no stage, but a living artwork. I did not time my 'performances' but rather recorded 
everything. I edited this material later when home in Glasgow. During travel and after in 
edit, fictions seemed to emerge from fractions of truth. It was a liberating experience to 
not  'plan'  an  installation,  but  to  let  it  take  its  own shape.  Together  with  the  visual 
5 In Treignac is an artist-run gallery and residency space called Treignac Projet. There I was to take part 
in PATIO. In its second year, PATIO is a process of developing and maintaining networks between 
geographically dispersed actors through short-term, discursive meetings and active projects. There I 
had the chance to develop my portfolio, my thesis, and install another installation called Oral History 
Museum - a work conceived by architect Kelwin Palmer. Many thanks to Sam Basu, Elizabeth 
Murray, Kelwin Palmer, Tim Coles, and Siobhan Tessa Milne. 
8material, it creates a heavy collage of moments during travel and art-making. Choosing 
the medium of film plays  on this refusal  to stop time, as   the  images and sounds 
provocatively wormhole and never reveal their now-past time or location. I aimed for a 
fluid experience of time and space, and inspired by the philosophies of Henry Bergson 
and others, I came to understand a notion of continuous time and coexistent time. Ideas 
of  duration  informed  what  has  become ,  in  its  online  presence,  a  shortcut  through 
conventional time a space. The interaction with the materials in Worm, creates a kind of 
movement through time and space, rather than a reference to it. Or even, Worm function 
as an object that times in that it holds the properties of time. Indeed, my initial attempt 
with Worm to map out a journey gave way to a more fuzzy, uncanny notion of reality. 
Very quickly it became obvious to me the insincerity of my initial approach to 'stage' 
installations. In a way I felt it would take away from the would-be art object. Framed in 
this way, any result of this staging seemed to be mere appearance of what was, rather 
than a more fruitful attempt at what the materials could be. The object was already past. 
This trying to indicate an action led to any art production being frozen in its already 
becoming state. This realisation helped me to re-evaluate what this project could be.
In fact, both of these works are the result of many edits, revisions, and reformulations. It 
is  this  process  of  working that  interests  me;  its  imaginings  but  also,  essentially,  its 
failures.  Chicken,  for  example, was  first  planned  to  be  installed  as  part  of  Sound 
Thought  2012,  for  which I  worked  as  an active committee member  and production 
manager. However, upon installing the work, in order to adjust the angle of the wires I 
attached play-doh to the sensors to weigh them down. The water content of the play-doh 
caused them to short circuit. With this experience of failure I had the opportunity to 
refine the structure of the work to make it both more robust and elegant. 
9However, while the two work share the quality of multiple lives, they also differ in 
many ways.  Worm,  for  example,  involves  but  does  not  pressure.  It  is  intentionally 
everywhere  and  nowhere.  Contrasted  to  Chicken,  it  is  lightweight  and  mobile.  The 
persistent ritualistic announcement in Chicken - 'this is happening now, pay attention to 
my art' - is abandoned in Worm for more fluid narratives and dislocated subjectivities. 
Whereas Chicken points to the unknown and uncanny realm of the the sky and makes it 
present and physical, Worm attempts to map out time and space as derived from objects; 
the sounds and events are not located on a map as nodes to be reached and traversed, but 
are dissolved, intangible assemblages of a road trip. Whereas Chicken occupies the air 
and then falls to intervene a more earthly realm, Worm has a more complex orientation 
to  the  earth  by  problematising  its  possible  categorisation  by  way  of  invoking 
multiplicity and wormholing. In Worm the mapping of the earth involves the activation 
of the journey so that the destination no longer becomes a marker, or node or orientation 
point. I will now begin to delve deeper into the process of this portfolio, and start with a 
discussion on failure. 
10
Figure 2. Image A from Chicken installation.
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CHICKEN & WORM: FAILURE
When a  work fails  it  disturbs  and  shocks:  how could this  happen? where  does  the 
problem lie? why is this happening to me? The object in question comes strikingly into 
view, the creator-object becoming obsessed with its 'thingness,' its unresponsivenesss, 
its refusal to cooperate. When something breaks its objecthood stares you right in the 
face. You are frustatingly responsible for this object yet you seem to have no control 
over it. If it fails, you fail. The artist-creator is defunked. The object reveals itself to you 
and yet no solution appears. 
 
This failure is one result of the artist's proposition of material. It is an act of articulation 
which tumbles and mumbles in its delivery. The intention in Chicken was to overwhelm 
in delivery - an act achieved through an articulation of excess and multiplicity. While 
the first staging of  Chicken could not uphold this relatively complicated delivery of 
material comprising of multiple sound sources and high volumes, the second staging as 
documented in the portfolio keeps it together, but only just. Difficulty and inarticulation 
are themes that run throughout my portfolio. This reflects an interest of mine in facing 
the impossibility of direct or transparent communication. 
The  Chicken event is  framed as art  but  its  signification is  somewhat  unclear as the 
montaged elements fight with each other;  bells sound against the black sky and one 
movement of the hand effects the architecture of the space.  The artist is present but all 
she seems to communicate is her internal sounds, rather than any outward display of 
communication.  This  paradoxical  articulation  of  the  medium  in  order  to  allow  the 
process of disarticulation to be made visible could be called a liquefication of language. 
12
It is like a map without a key. A journey without a destination. The Chicken installation 
is itself a material assemblage of tries and starts to dissolve language and to re-evaluate 
the  narrativity  implicit  in  artistic  creation.  Formally  it  suffocates  and  confuses:  the 
interactive sheet hanging claustrophobically close to the audience/participants, and the 
montaged  quality  of  the  sonic  elements  clash  against  each  other  disallowing  any 
straightforward signification. In Worm we see elements of a map but their specificity is 
unclear.  The voice present  in the audio drifts  in and out of perceptibility and shifts 
subjectivities, telling the story of multiple selves. 
This is an act of the author under erasure. One artist, Marcel Broodthaers, explicitly 
staged this confusion of signs.  Broodthaers,  for  example,  prefers not to perform the 
various tasks usually incumbent upon the artist- exploring instead the efficacy of a self-
imposed muteness and failure. In his 1969 film La Pluie (Projet pour un texte) he stages 
such an event. In this film he is seated outside at a desk and begins to write. As he does 
so, rain starts to fall onto his page flooding his newly penned inky letters. He persists 
despite the downpour and the dissolution of his words. As Ed Krĉma describes it: 'The 
regression of the legible sign to watery stain or disarticulated flow, far from opening 
onto  a  liberated  expressive  plenitude,  instead  stages  an  enigmatic  withdrawal  and 
tautology.  '6  The  trace of  a  line and  the mapping of  thoughts  are  erased  and their 
significance - their usefulness - dissolves. It  is a  subtracting of sense. This approach 
influenced both Chicken and Worm in that it points to the potential for an eviscerated, 
desiccated  language  of  pure  exchange  to  be  examined  and  made  ambiguous  in  its 
dissolution. In its place flows something like Lacan’s inarticulate ‘kernel of non-sense.’7 
6  Ed Krĉma, 'Liquid Language,' originally published in Edwin Carels (ed.), Graphology–Drawing from 
Automatism to Automation. Drawing Room, London, ARA.MER, Ghent and M HKA, Antwerp, 2012, 
50-58.
7  See Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis, trans. Alan Sheridan, 
(London: Vintage, 1998), 250ff. 
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This insistence in not making sense, confusingly enough, is another theme of my work. 
This thesis tries to explain this process of making art that struggles to articulate. In the 
moment of articulation I often felt anxiety. I think this anxiety could be best described 
as the effect of the uncanny. 
CHICKEN & WORM: THE UNCANNY
The uncanny involves a concern with events in which repressed material returns in ways 
that disrupt unitary identity,  aesthetic norms, and social  order.  That which made the 
work fail - my mistakes, my inexperience - resurfaced just at the moment when I was to 
establish my artistic identity. This moment of disruption is carried through into Worm's 
refusal to locate and delineate, and its disorienting conception of time. 
André Breton said the following of his fellow practitioners of surrealism:
'Everything tends to make us believe that there exists a certain point of the mind at 
which life and death, the real and the imagined, past and future, the communicable, and 
the incommunicable, high and low, cease to be perceived as contradictions. Now, search 
as  one  may one  will  never  find  any other  motivating  force  in  the  activities  of  the 
Surrealists  than  the  hope  of  finding  and  fixing  this  point.'8 The  practitioners  of 
surrealism work to find this point yet at the same time they do not want to be pierced by 
it, for these binaries only come together in the experience of the uncanny, and its stake 
is no less than death.9
8  André Breton, 'Second manifesto du Surréalisme,' La Révolution surréaliste 12 (December 15, 1929); 
trans. Richard Seaver and Helen R. Lane in Manifestoes of Surrealism (Ann Arbor, 1972), 123-4. 
9  Hal Foster, Compulsive Beauty (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), xix. 
14
This uncanny death of the artist is approached when the author is under erasure - when 
the author faces the impossibility of direct communication, of any true knowledge of 
reality and the ability to express it in its fullest form. In his essay ‘Liquid Words,’ Yve-
Alain  Bois  writes,  ‘Whoever  says  “articulation”always  says,  in  the  first  instance, 
“divisibility into minimal units”: the articulus is the particle. Language is a hierarchical 
combination of bits… Liquid, on the contrary(…), is indivisible (…). Thus, properly 
speaking there cannot be liquid words (…)except in the brief moment at which they 
have just been penned and the ink is not yet dry.’ 10
The ink not yet being dry is also a useful way to think about artistic processes. The 
second iteration of Chicken took place at  ANACOLUTHON - an experimental night I 
curated of postgraduate students  in the School of Culture and Creative Arts. The name 
ANACOLUTHON came from an interest in artistic process. Most works presented were 
works-in-progress,  one  of  many  iterations,  and  on-going  inquiries.  The  word 
'anacoluthon' means an inconsistency or an incoherence in logic; a failure to follow on. 
As a rhetorical device it can be understood as a change of syntax within a sentence, 
gesturing towards  how we  think  to  ourselves.  Stream of  consciousness  writing,  for 
example,  includes  twists  of  imagination,  or  caesurae in  our  personal  lyrics,  often 
resulting in a confusion of meaning. Philosopher Tim Morton speaks of anxiety as 'the 
intrusion of a non-human into the narrative frame.'11 This invasion of an other defies the 
completion of the thought - left to be in suspended in flux. With a destructuring of the 
10 Rosalind Krauss and Yve-Alain Bois, Formless, A User’s Guide, (New York: Zone, 1997), 124.  These 
two liquefactions of language involve both a subtraction of one kind of ‘sense’ – that of 
communicable meaning – and the adoption of opposed positions in relation to another – sense as in 
‘sensation’. See Michael Newman, ‘The Marks, Traces, and Gestures of Drawing,’ in Catherinede 
Zegher (ed.),The Stage of Drawing: Gesture and Act, Tate and The Drawing Center  (London and 
New York: 2003), 100. Referring to both Cy Twombly and Broodthaers, Newman ends a recent essay 
by asserting that ‘the work of art happens as non-sense.’ Michael Newman, ‘Absolute Nonsense’ in 
Sabine Folie (ed.), Un Coupde Dés, Writing Turned Image. An Alphabet of Pensive Language 
(Vienna: Generali Foundation, 2008), 223.
11  Tim Morton, 'They Are Here' published on Ecology Without Nature 
http://ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/they-are-here-my-nonhuman-turn-talk.html
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sentence, another presence is felt - a rush to change - an uncanny disturbance as the sign 
encroaches the referent - leaving the object ambiguous. In terms of  Chicken, this can 
also be thought of as the reorientation of the viewer-listener to look up,to consider our 
situation,  to  consider  what  lies  above  our  heads.  The  dropped  sheet  and  curious 
interactivity of the hanging material draw a response from the audience/participants to 
reach upwards and listen for effect. Also the bells which accompany this event evoke 
these sounds of the sky. At this point I would like to mention how Dixon usefully relates 
the function of bells to impart localism to Heidegger's notion of dwelling, that is, the 
way in which we live and keep our place on earth ours and safe. Heidegger states that 
'Mortals dwell in that they receive the sky as sky. They leave to the sun and the moon 
their  journey,  to  the  stars  their  courses,  to  the  seasons  their  blessing  and  their 
inclemency; they do not turn night into day nor day into a harassed unrest.'12 
Heidegger invokes the notion of the Fourfold to approach an understanding of human 
existence which 'consists of the coming together of four distinct realms of Being: the 
Earth, the Sky, the Divinities, and Mortals.'13 Sound, it is argued, plays an important role 
in our dwelling on earth and our necessary dealings with the space above our heads. The 
ringing of church bells was and still is believed to be a means to create a space for 
humanity and  to ward off unknown dangers of the sky. Demons would be 'horrified'14 
and angels would respond; 'it occupies the skies and calls out to, or repels, divinities.'15 
This intervention of the sky, as witnessed in  Chicken,  implies an intervention of its 
inhabitants - the divinities. This act of looking up plays on the human trait of asking for 
inspiration, or begging for forgiveness - our waiting for the divine to guide what is out-
12  Martin Heidegger, Poetry Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstader (New York: Harper Collins, 
2001), 148. 
13  Dixon, op. cit, 116. 
14  Corbain, op cit., 101.
15  Dixon, op. cit., 118. 
16
of-hand - to create a split - a break from the imagined eventuality. When we look up, we 
pause, humbled in respect of the sacred, but also in fear of its unknown workings. We 
feel  vulnerable  in  the  realisation of  the  sky's  indifference  to  our  well-being.  The 
dawning of something bigger than us is embodied in the material approach of Chicken. 
It  is  a  material  invocation of  what  Morton calls  the hyperobject  -  an object  that  is 
'massively distributed in time and space relative to  human scales.'16 He says that they 
are 'so huge and so long lasting compared with humans that they obviously seem both 
vivid and highly unreal for exactly the same reasons.'17 Chicken, then, functions in this 
way to evoke the uncanniness of being, to make myth or horror of daily life. Sound, as 
Dixon  says,  can  'enchant  the  air...briefly  make  the  sky  sacred.'18 And  particularly 
acousmatic music,  according to Dixon, 'belongs to the air  more radically than other 
musical genres.'19 Its spatialisation, its resonance, and its verticality, make it seemlessly 
straddle both what is near and the realm beyond and out of grasp. He says: 'a sound 
without source or body, a sound that thickens the air and fashions impossible resonance 
spaces, and even, through sheer volume and impact encroaches on planes of fear in us, 
will inevitably cause the air to be sacralised.'20 This effect of acousmatic music is close 
to how Morton describes the work in the time of ecological awareness: 'an art that does 
the art of the time of hyperobjects is an art that explores the uncanniness of beings, the 
uniqueness of beings, the irony of the interrelationships between beings, and the ironic 
secondariness of the intermeshing between beings.'21
The one to sense this uncanny fear of the untouchable is driven to an unsteady state of 
16  Tim Morton, 'The Time of Hyperobjects: Hegel, Ecology, Aesthetics,' 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jrvA3nv0Py4
17  Tim Morton, Dawn of the Hyperobjects,' http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NS8b87jnqnw
18  Dixon, op. cit., 116. 
19  Ibid., 119. 
20 Ibid.
21  Morton, 'Dawn of the Hyperobjects.'  
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dwelling. The one who predicts danger is a prophet or a scaremonger. The remoteness 
and indifference of the sky upsets the hysteric and the ill. For although 'we see in the 
sky the sovereign realm of chance,'22 we also 'see a realm of terror, terrorist death that 
strikes at random, strikes without consideration of innocence or guilt, strikes anyone 
who just happens to be there.'23 
During the Chicken event I have a silicon suction cup microphone attached to my chest 
which sounds the beating of my heart (listen for the low thud throughout the recording). 
I hold my breath for periods of time to quicken the heartbeat. The beating heart can be 
seen to affirm bodily presence, however, in the project concerned this phenomenon is 
not audible to provide a source of the sounds created, but rather to monitor the artist's 
reaction to and interaction with the other participants, and her fear of this horrifying 
collapse  of  the  sky.  Any change  in  rhythm or  tempo  comes  from outside  in  what 
surrounds.  For as Lingis states: 'Not only do emotions discharge their  forces on the 
outside  environments;  they  have  their  source  in  it.'24 Unpredictable,  nonteleological 
movements  of  interactive  installation spaces  highlight  this  exchange of  emotions  in 
continual adjustment to the environment. As Lingis continues: 'The speeds, slowness, 
and turns  of our movements come from movements we meet  about us.'25 The body 
meets others and experiences the world as convulsed, just like the hysteric, thrust into 'a 
forest of symbols.'26
22  Alphonso Lingis, Dangerous Emotions (Berkeley: University of Claifornia Press, 1998), 114. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Lingis, op. cit., 18.
25 Ibid., 29.
26 André Breton, L'Amour fou (Paris, 1937), trans. by Mary Ann Caws as Mad Love (Lincoln, 1987), 15. 
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Figure 3. Image B from Chicken installation.
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Of course, the heart and bodily sounds have long been associated with the affirmation of 
the non-existence of silence - remember, if you have forgotten, John Cage's experience 
in  an  anechoic  chamber  at  Harvard  University  in  1951.27 This  story  tells  of  the 
omnipresence of music. We have a situation in which any sound we produce does not 
come  from  the  individual  as  such,  but  from  outside  and  beyond.  Lingis  has  said: 
'Humans do not begin to sing, and do not sing, in dead silence. Our voices begin to purr, 
hum, and crescendo in the concerto and cacophony of nature and machines.'28
This grand statement also illustrates the dependence we have on situation and those we 
interact with- our relationality. In this way, our profusion of language and opinion is 
symptomatic  of  our  sociality  and  the  confined  temporality/duration  of  any state  of 
isolation,  eventually  demanding  expression  or  narration  to  others.  The  process  of 
autobiography can lead one to illness in hypochondria for example,  but its opposite - a 
silent passivity - is unsustainable. As our heart beats it is felt and moved by others. Its 
rhythm propels us forward while it gestures backward; simultaneously projective and 
recursive. Rhythm redeems present potentiality from the chronology of past and future. 
As Giorgio Agamben has said: 'Rhythm grants men both the ecstatic dwelling in a more 
original dimension and the fall into the flight of measurable time.'29 With the repetition 
of rhythm we have the becomingness of being freed of any intrinsic ontological unity 
and yet it firmly situates us as 'here'. 
The  very act  of  performance  in  Chicken and  Worm  provokes  ideas  of  presentness, 
autobiography, and narrative statement. To engage in dialogue, conversation, call and 
27  Michael Nyman, Experimental Music: Cage and Beyond (Music in the Twentieth Century 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 25-6.
28 Lingis, op. cit., 34.
29  Giorgio Agamben, The Man without Content (Stanford, Californian: Stanford University Press, 
1994), 100. 
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response, writing, is for the 'I' to take shape. The self  forms in the act of narration. A 
response of any means is the mark of the self's need to both escape the weight of being 
and render the self as thinking autonomous subject. Indeed, autobiography is readily 
inscribed into the artist's production. With live performance this connection tends to be 
made even more readily, as in music performance there is a tendency towards reading a 
personal  identification  with  the  sounds  the  performer  creates.  There  is  an  insistent 
autobiography at  play and it is this personalising of the music which reappears as a 
common criticism of improvisatory practices particularly. The firmly ingrained notion 
of music as self-expression can be disagreeable for many. Gavin Bryars in conversation 
with Derek Bailey, for example, describes this situation in improvisation thus: 'It’s like 
standing a painter next to his picture so that every time you see the painting you see the 
painter as well and you can’t see it  without him. And because of that the music,  in 
improvisation, doesn’t stand alone. It’s corporeal.'30 In this example, the music is non-
autonomous, instead carried by and implicit in the body. It is as though in improvisation 
the artist makes a sacrifice to take the load of the sounds upon and within his presented 
being. These ideas of autobiography are explored the bodily presence of the artist in 
Chicken  and her internal dialogue of nerves presented by her audible racing heart. In 
Worm  the artist's subjectivity is undermined by the multiple narrative voices and her 
dislocated bodily self. But isn't any sort of meaningful engagement with another person 
a type of sacrifice? Lingis states that 'Each time we enter into conversation we expose 
ourselves to being altered or emptied out, emptied of our convictions, our expectations, 
our  memories.'31 To  converse,  to  communicate  with  another,  we  give  up  a  part  of 
ourselves; it is self-destructive and dangerous.
30  Gavin Bryars quoted in Derek Bailey, ‘Free Improvisation,’ from Improvisation: Its Nature and 
Practice in Music (New York: Da Capo, 1992), excerpt reproduced in Audio Culture: Reading in 
Modern Music, ed. Christoph Cox and Daniel Warner (New York: Continuum, 2006), 255-65: 263.
31  Lingis, op. cit., 100. 
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CHICKEN & WORM: SELFHOOD 
But what would it  mean to be 'self-destructive'? Throughout the development of my 
portfolio I was concerned with problematising subjectivity and selfhood with questions 
of agency, responsibility and decision in 'creative' action that tease art objects and their 
makers. The resulting destruction and anxiety in this approach has a long history, and 
could even be posited as the origin of tragedy. The tragic figure, from Oedipus to Tony 
Soprano,  knows  all  too  well  pain  in  anagnorisis.  Self-questioning  of  our  own 
consistency plays a part in every iteration, every artistic 'look at this' and 'hear me now,' 
every narrative projection. In the act of performance the stage become so clear and one's 
place in it is deeply complicated. One finds oneself within Plato's allegory of the cave 
contemplating the theatre of shadows. One interpretation of this parable is to understand 
that outside the cave there is some true reality, some ultimate real. But another is to 
understand that outside is just another, different theatre of shadows. As Slavoj Žižek 
explains in his Parallax View 'the properly Lacanian twist to the story would have been 
that for us, within the cave, the Real outside can appear only as a shadow of a shadow, 
as a gap between different modes or domains of shadows.'32 
However there is a more drastic interpretation, that proposed by Thomas Metzinger in 
his book Being No One: that there is no one in the cave.33 As Žižek  explains it: 'The 
cave, rather, projects itself (its entire machinery) onto the screen: the theatre of shadows 
works as the self-representation (self-model) of the cave. In other words, the observing 
subject itself is also a shadow, the result of the mechanism of representation: the "self" 
stands for the way a human organism experiences itself, appear to itself, and there is no 
32 Slavoj Žižek, Parallax View (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), 162.
33 Thomas Metzinger, Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity (Cambridge: MIT Press, 
2003).
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one behind the veil of self-appearance, no substantial reality: '34 What place has art when 
the  self  is  just  a  process?  What  of  the  audience?  In  Metzinger's  formulation  the 
phenomenal self-model is transparent as we only ever see the content and never see 
consciousness itself.35 If we are part of some dream-like reality where all the world's a 
stage everyone becomes a puppet unaware of the medium of the world, as conscious 
experience itself is an invisible interface. The audience shares the dream-like reality of 
the stage artist - as the performer performs, they too remain quiet and graciously clap 
when directed. 
However, for my purposes in particular, this theory is reductive, as according to this 
theory  the  stage  becomes  all  important  and  the  whole  involving  process  of  social 
context is essentially reliant on being framed and heard to exist. I encountered these 
issues in the initial staging of Worm. What I mean by this is if one relies on the spectator 
to complete the art object, what we have is a humanist conception of art that prioritises 
the thinking subject (over the object itself). This is rather like the approach associated 
with Nicolas Bourriaud’s term Relational Aesthetics. Bourriaud defines this as: 'a a set 
of artistic practices which take as their theoretical and practical point of departure the 
whole  of  human  relations  and  their  social  context,  rather  than  an  independent  and 
private space.'36 In this conception the artist becomes the facilitator rather than maker, 
and  the  art  is  'a  state  of  encounter.'37 The  social  space  constructed  with  relational 
aesthetics in mind does not prioritise objects to be apprehended. Liam Gillick suggests 
34 Žižek, op. cit., 162.
35  'The illusion is irresistible. Behind every face there is a self. We see the signal of consciousness in a 
gleaming eye and imagine some ethereal space beneath the vault of the skull, lit by shifting patterns of 
feeling and thought, with charged intention. An essence. But what do we find in the space behind the 
face, when we look? The brute fact is there is nothing but material substance: flesh and blood and 
bone and brain...You look down into an open hand, watching the brain pulsate, watching the surgeon 
tug and probe, and you understand with absolute conviction that there is nothing more to it. There's no 
one there.' 
Paul Broks, Into the Silent Land: Travels in Neuropsychology (London: Atlantic Books, 2003), 17.
36 Nicholas Bourriaud, Relational Aesthetics (Paris: Les presses du réel, 1998). 
37 Ibid., 18.
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even that: 'My work is like the light in the fridge—it only works when there are people 
there to open the fridge door. Without people, it’s not art—it’s something else—stuff in 
a room.'38 
This formulation of the work as though its affects were intended solely for us through 
the production of discursive curatorial elements holds the subject at its centre which 
generates  a  humanist  set  of  beliefs.  In  this  way,  the  relation  between  objects  and 
subjects is as though the object - the artwork  is  for the subject. To put this in context, if 
I had continued with my original idea for Worm to stage installations in public places, I 
would have been forcing an audience to encounter the work and somehow imply that it 
was being expressed 'for them.' 
I came to question this expectancy placed on the art object and choose not to rely on the 
human  compulsion  to  categorise and  delineate.  Indeed,  humans  are  thought  to  be 
representational creatures, possessing a  Platonic 'eros for form,'39 but what remains is 
the paradox that it is possible to feel a touch, a closeness towards an object, to feel its 
affect, and to  know that the object can never fully be understood by concept alone. This 
is what we say of the withdrawn nature of objects. To say that an artwork can be non-
38  Liam Gillick quoted in Liam Gillick, Renovation Filter: Recent Past and Near Future (Bristol: 
Arnolfini, 2000), 16. See also Lars Bang Larsen speaking at a recent conference in the iCI
'If there is a common denominator between the things I will be talking about tonight […] it is the issue 
of translation, whether its problems of cultural translation […] the act of inscribing one’s subjectivity 
on an artwork, the act of interpreting an artwork from the situation you find yourself in, or how artists 
operate between different formal vocabularies and different fields of knowledge.'
(The Curator’s Perspective iCI 2009).
39  Humans are ‘representational creatures with representational habits of thought. We inhabit an internal 
and an external world. We separate ourselves as subjects of the object world. Indeed, this alienated 
state is the very precondition of self-consciousness…Art mirrors back an apparently reassuring image 
of our own subjectivity (an outer form and an inner content). As such, a transformation in how we 
think about at will necessarily alter the topology of how we think about ourselves and visa versa. It is 
in this sense that the crisis of representation is also a crisis in typical subjectivity…Representation is 
the condition of our subjectivity and as such has to be “gone through” as it were.’ Simon O’  Sullivan, 
Art Encounters Deleuze and Guattari - Thought Beyond Representation (New York: Palgrave, 2006), 
9-37. See also Mihaela C. Fistioc, The Beautiful Shape of the Good: Platonic and Pythagorean 
Themes in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment (New York: Routledge, 2002), 104.
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conceptual - extra-philosophical - is to understand that it can produce determinations 
that are beyond the human. This involves a radical reformulation of the place of the 
audience. This informed my reformulation of Worm in that the pressure on the audience 
- those beings who would surround and invade my impromptu stage - would become 
implicit in the work without their consent and with no real need for their eyes and ears 
at that time for the completion of the work. Their presence was in a way superfluous 
because the work was not for or about them. 
CHICKEN & WORM: TIME & SPACE
As  I  developed  my  portfolio  I  became  less  interested  in  staged  installations  that 
somehow delineate a specific time of performance. I was instead drawn to fluid notions 
of time and space, inspired by philosopher Henri Bergson and others. Effectually I felt 
this initial staging of  Worm broke with the present reality, in that it seemed to draw a 
boundary around 'now' and any such measurement of time and space seemed false.  In 
Bergson's formulation, reliance on representation of time in spatial terms is contrasted 
to  pure  duration  which  he  proposes  as  ‘succession  without  distinction.’  40 In  other 
words,  for  him,  duration  is  a  form  of  temporal  continuity  that  is  concerned  with 
qualitative differentiation, without quantitative measure.  He sees the measurement of 
time as separating present and former states. As Morton explains: 'since at the quantum 
scale  to  measure  means “to  hit  with  a  photon  or  an electron  beam” (or  whatever), 
measurement,  perception  (aisthesis),  and  doing become the  same.  What  I  “see”  are 
deflections,  tracks  in  a  diffusion  cloud  chamber  or  interference  patterns.  Far  from 
underwriting a world of pure illusion where the mind is king, quantum theory is one of 
40 Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness (1989), trans. 
F. L. Pogson (London: 1910), 98-100. 
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the very first truly rigorous realisms, thinking its objects as irreducibly resistant to full 
comprehension, by anything.'41 
If  during  Worm I  was to  delineate the present  and merely document its  occurrence 
without further investigation, I imagined this  would result in the representation of the 
past as merely past and no more. If, for example, to measure is to record the reflection - 
the trail - of an object, it is not attending to the object itself, but to an illusion of its 
presence.  Further, to reconceptualise these theories in terms of time and duration, one 
could say that the appearance of an object is its past. If,  for example, we remember 
Zeno's paradox, we know that measured time is working by hindsight. That which we 
can encounter of an object is 'the past, the afterglow.'42  Thus we could say that the 
appearance of an object is its past and its essence is futurely; the quantitative elements 
of an object are that which have been. As Morton proposes:  'facts are the shadow of 
things, their each thrown into the past. facts are nothing on the face of things. facts are 
on the side of illusion because there are real  things that they don't  touch. under the 
frisson of unmeaning, there are entities - facts are nothing on the face of them.'43 
These ideas surrounding facts as past gained further importance for me when thinking 
about 'mapping.' I will detail this process later in relation to mapping as a trace. 
To  return  to  Bergson,  he  radically  argued  for  the  severance  of  time  from  its 
representation in spatial terms; a divorce from what he thought to be the nonessential 
conceptual  dependence  on  space.  Time,  according  to  Bergson  in  his  Essay  on  the 
Immediate Data of Consciousness (1889),  when conceived as existent  within spatial 
form is ‘some spurious concept, due to the trespassing of the idea of space upon the 
41 Morton, 'Objects as Temporary Autonomous Zones,' continent 1.3 (2011),  149-155: 150. 
42 Morton, They Are Here.  
43 Ibid.
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field of pure consciousness.’ This instance is what he deems to be ‘nothing but the ghost 
of  space  haunting  the  reflective  consciousness.’44 In  this  way,  we  allow  more 
possibilities of experience when we divorce time from space and acknowledge and exist 
within a multiplicity of conscious states that succeed themselves without division. This 
theory of time allows for a blurring of past, present and future in that looking back does 
not situate the subject in a past state but instead does not situate the subject specifically; 
the ego ‘refrains from separating its present state from former states.’ Bergson calls for 
the  resistance  to  what  he  calls  ‘the  cinematographical  mechanism  of  thought;’  a 
mechanism which allows a concept such as nostalgia to exist.45 By the cinematographic 
- the division of times - Bergson means that commonly, ‘Instead of attaching ourselves 
to the inner becomings of things, we place ourselves outside them in order to recompose 
their  becoming artificially.  We take snapshots,  as  it  were,  of  the passing reality...’46 
These ideas informed my choice of medium in Worm, in that I wanted to test the filmic 
material and push it into a kind of warped reality. I experimented with the notion that 
this practice of the episodic division of time is false in that reality exists as fluid and 
constant and so to measure it is to immobilize it. Any categorization of time is at odds 
with  Bergson’s  notion of  continuous,  coexistent  time.  Brian Massumi elaborates  on 
Bergson’s theory on Zeno’s paradoxes of movement saying: 'We stop it [the arrow] in 
thought when we construe its movement to be divisible into position. Bergson’s idea is 
that  space  itself  is  retrospective construct  of  this  kind.  When we think of  space  as 
“extensive,” as being measurable, divisible, and composed of points plotting possible 
44 See Bergson, Time and Free Will. 
45 Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (London: MacMillan, 1912), 330.
This also has meaning for the strange occurrence that is Nostalgia. Etymologically, nostalgia itself 
comes from nostos meaning return home, and algia meaning longing. However, we can understand 
nostalgia to mean a longing for a home that no longer exists or has never existed, and also feeling sick 
of home, or rather feeling oppressed to some degree by the conventional confines of time and space. 
In other words, nostalgia can manifest itself as a result of a pervasive teleology of progress. An 
alternative to this end- directed, progressive conception of time and space, is that proposed by the 
Bergson. 
46 Ibid., 322.
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positions that objects may occupy, we are stopping the world in though. We are thinking 
away its dynamic unity,  the continuity of its movements. We are looking at only one 
dimension of reality.'47 In this way, when one thinks, one does so in a backwards way, in 
that to use the intellect is to stop time itself in motion.  Bergson was interested in the 
idea  of  the  contemporaneousness  of  the  past  and  the  present,48 and  it  is  with  this 
formation that the resistance of episodic, ‘cinematographical’ mechanisms of thought 
remove the issue of before and after (and also depth theory in general). 
However,  in  terms  of  this  reading  of  how objects  travel  through space,  the  object 
effectively occupies the space. This is at odds with how I imagine the Worm project as 
existing multiple spaces and time - not existing within spaces and time. The sounds 
wormhole; they create their own trajectory, their own map. Morton usefully rethinks this 
notion by suggesting that motion is the state of reality itself. I found this re-evaluation 
of the present useful in the development of  Worm. As he puts it: 'Either everything is 
just an illusion and nothing really moves at all (Parmenides). Or objects are here and 
not-here “at the same time.”49 This latter possibility provides the basic setup for all the 
motion we could wish for. Objects are not “in” time and space. Rather, they “time” (a 
verb) and “space.” They produce time and space. It would be better to think these verbs 
as intransitive rather than transitive, in the manner of  dance  or  revolt. They emanate 
from  objects,  yet  they  are  not  the  object.'50 He  continues  to  explain  how   how 
problematic  it  is  to  presume that  the human can know or  to  be  able to  distinguish 
47 Brian Massumi, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 2002), 6.
48 ‘Your perception, however instantaneous, consists then in an incalculable multitude of remembered 
elements; in truth every perception is already memory. Practically we perceive only the past, the pure 
present being the invisible progress of the past gnawing into the future.’ Bergson, Matter and Memory, 
trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (New York: Zone Books, 1991), 149.
49 Morton, They Are Here. 
50 Morton, 'Objects as Temporary Autonomous Zones,'  op. cit., 152. See Graham Priest, In 
Contradiction (Oxford University Press, 2006), 172-181. 
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between the object itself and that which the object emits: 'How can we know the dancer 
from the dance?'51
Thus we can propose that time and space emanate from objects, and that the appearance 
of objects is their echo, their trace. The documentation of Worm is mindful of this notion 
in  that  it  involves  film  (a  medium long  associated  with  truthfulness)  but  does  not 
suggest  specificity.  It  comprises  a  blurry reality that  is  not  necessarily intended for 
human comprehension and critique. And yet it does as, in this case, it is presented for 
examination. To deal with this contradiction, I have presented this material and given it 
a new existence online specifically for this cause. Essentially, however, I felt the the 
work that I have done in experiencing this journey is all I can ask for. I understand the 
simple documentation of time and space as an echo, or shrinking effect of that object. 
As Morton states: 'appearance is the trace of death, namely, the form of a thing, which 
just is the past. Form is the past. The withdrawn essence of the thing, on the other hand, 
can't be located in measurable, ontologically given space.'52 The withdrawn essence of 
an object is not for human to know, to see, to hear - to presume this option would be 
humanist  and  anthropocentric.  While  we  can  now  understand  objects'  status  to  be 
levelled with a kind of flattish ontology, human perception can no longer be set upon a 
pedestal. 
Here we have a phenomenon similar to what Walter Benjamin called aura - in that this 
strange  webbing  of  time  and  space  produced  from  the  Worm object  involves  the 
perception of a 'forgotten human dimension.'53 This uncanny return of a familiar time 
51 William Butler Yeats, “Among School Children,” Collected Poems, ed. Richard J. Finneran (New 
York: Scribner, 1996). 
52 Morton, They Are Here, op. cit. 
53 Walter Benjamin, "A Short History of Photography" (1931), trans. Phil Patton, in Alan Trachtenberg, 
ed., Classic Essays on Photography (New Haven, 1980). See also Miriam Hansen, 'Banjamin, 
Ciniema and Experience: 'The Blue Flower in the Land of Technology,'" New German Critique 40 
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made  strange  is  temporal  in  that  the  form -  the  a  distorted  trace  of  presence,  this 
appearance of an object past - is the appearance of something distant but arrestingly 
close  to  hand.54 In  Worm the sounds,  images and  films are intentionally ambiguous 
about  their  location  and  context.  They  provide  snippets   of  narrative,  at  once  the 
listener/viewer in pulled up close to some object-event that must be past but seems up 
close, only to be washed away to elsewhere. Montaged fragments hint at places and 
things but never reveal all. While making the work, I started thinking about time that 
does not sit, surround, lie in wait - time that has no one directionality - it is bisexual 
time.  These art objects conjure that which is emitted by things - that which is unclear 
and uncanny. As John Donne says: each  object is 'a little world made cunningly.'55 
CHICKEN & WORM: OBJECTS
Graham Harman, for example, would say that the object is never fully exhausted by the 
connections it makes with other objects, as it withdraws from relations. To understand 
this philosophy it is important to grasp Harman’s formulation of objects as unified and 
autonomous, as that which have a life apart from their 'relations, accidents, qualities, 
and moments.'56  Harman sees that the problem with philosophy up until now is that it 
hasn’t properly accounted for objects as such - that it has forgotten that  'An object is 
grazed only lightly by another, not drained to the dregs.'57 Again, the presupposition that 
objects are there for human contemplation is undermined for the dramatic realisation 
that  reality  is  not  for  humans  -  in  other  words,  the  abandonment  of  an  idea  that 
(Winter 1987), 179-224.
54 Benjamin, "A Short History of Photography" op. cit., 209.
55 John Donne, Holy Sonnets 15, in The Major Works: Including Songs and Sonnets and Sermons, ed. 
John Carey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
56 Graham Harman, Intentional Objects for Non-Humans, (2008). 
57 Graham Harman, Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics (Melbourne: re.press, 2009), 
112.  
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presupposes things exist in the world for our cognition of them.58 And what a terrifying 
and unsettling realisation it is that everything always has more parts than a whole to it. 
With the rejection of overmining and undermining there is no background anymore and 
no foreground.59 While cognitively liberating, the realisation that  we can not come to 
objects as they actually are is uncanny. The time of the present  becomes an arbitrary 
boundary -  a  meaningless  distinction  of  human  perception  and  delineation.  We are 
existing on the inside of something, but we don't fully understand what the something 
is; that 'creepy reality' which Morton deems the dawn of the hyperobject. Our present 
time of noticing these larger entities - global warming, evolution, and nuclear radiation 
for example - we find ourselves immersed in a  strange reality and our place in  the 
universe dencentred. In Chicken this dawning of something big and relatively unknown 
is realised in the lowering of the sky so that it makes its presence known. It invokes the 
creepy realisation that there is a vastness above us and our relation to it is made unstable 
and unhomely through its intervention into the place where we dwell. 
Art that does art in the time of hyperobjects is 'art that strives to evoke hyperobjectivity 
in its very form'60 - it 'explores the uncanniness of beings, the uniqueness of beings, the 
irony  of  the  interrelationships  between  beings,  and  the  ironic  secondariness  of  the 
intermeshing  between  beings.'61 This  kind  of  art  does  not  have  to  be  some  sort  of 
conscious decision on the part of the artist - as human artists did not cause hyperobjects 
to appear for the very reason that the non-human has been here all along. The object, 
58 Tim Morton states: 'There are places in the universe that thinking can’t touch, I just don’t accept that 
when I think this untouchability I am touching it, this would be the Hegelian response to Kantianism, 
but unlike Kant and his correlationist legacy, I see this not as a reason to confine thinking to a little 
island of human meaningfulness but rather to embark on a speculative journey amidst an irreducible 
plenum of discreet, unique, sparkling objects, be they snow crystals, Arsenal or a single photon.' 
Morton, The Time of Hyperobjects op. cit.
59 Morton, The Shape of the I: OOO, Ecology, Marx, 
http://ecologywithoutnature.blogspot.co.uk/2012/04/shape-of-i-ooo-ecology-marx-mp3s.html
60 Morton, Dawn of the Hyperobjects, op. cit. 
61 Ibid. 
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and the hyperobject, is always already there. As Morton explains: 'Before we look at it, 
global warming is not a function of our measuring devices, yet because it's distributed 
across the biosphere and beyond, it's very hard to see it as a unique entity and yet there 
it  is  -  raining  on  us,  burning  down  on  us,  quaking  the  earth,  spawning  gigantic 
hurricanes  -  so  in  some deeply rigorous  sense,  hyperobjects  and  objects  in  general 
infested  human  art  forever.  All  that  has  happened  is  that  humans  have  dropped 
something: a concept. A concept that their art is by them, for them, about them...the 
human mist evaporates leaving behind what is real.'62 
The misty reality created by spraying spouting objects  - the 'mesh' of time and space - 
tempts the modernist brain to organise and to structure. But the shocking reality is that 
'the more maps we make, the more real things tear through them. Non-human entities 
emerge  through  our  mapping,  then  they destroy them.'63 In  the  making  of  Worm I 
meditated on this realisation that to map is to create arbitrary boundaries that have a 
limited lifespan. Boundary lines are forever redrawn and mountains move and crumble. 
To map is a political act and its function varied. I used a GPS device throughout my 
journey to track my movements with the initial  intention of being able to show the 
location of installations. In the end, the tracks created by the device are represented in 
Worm as possible paths, and possible actions. The device occasionally lost contact with 
satellites so when I upload the tracker to Google Earth I find gaps and glitches where I 
seem to have disappeared. At other times I seem to go off-road through fields, and at 
other times it looks as if I skipped the ferry and instead teleported myself across the 
Irish Sea.  The lines of my map are not to be trusted - they include wormholes. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. 
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Where this brings us now, in this discussion of process and art objects, is that it has 
become apparent that we need to rethink our relation to objects. Heidegger's ideas on 
tool use are often quoted in this regard and are particularly relevant to my previous 
discussion on the experience of failure, and the anxiety of brokenness. What is pertinent 
to  this  discussion  is  Heidegger's  formulation  of  vorhanden  (present-at-hand)   and 
zuhanden (ready-to-hand).64 Take a hammer: when a tool such as this is used to hit a 
nail,  it  disappears,  or  withdraws (Entzug),  as we are preoccupied with the nail  it  is 
hitting. If however the hammer slips, we might notice it: all of a sudden it becomes 
vorhanden  (present-at-hand) rather  than  zuhanden (ready-to-hand).   But  what of  the 
hammer itself? Is its use as a tool the entirety of of the hammer? No. Harman would say 
that  Heidegger's  formulation  represents  a  small  anthropocentric  slice  of  reality,  and 
never  uncovers  the  true  nature  of  the  hammer  itself.  As  Tim  Morton  states:  
'Harman discovered a gigantic coral reef of withdrawn entities beneath the Heideggerian 
submarine of Da-sein, which itself is operating at an ontological depth way below the 
choppy surface of philosophy, beset by the winds of epistemology, and infested with the 
sharks  of  materialism,  idealism,  empiricism  and  most  of  the  other  isms  that  have 
defined what is and what isn't for the last several hundred years. '65
64  Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, tr.ans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany, N.Y: State University of New 
York Press, 1996), 62–71. See also Graham Harman, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of  
Objects (Peru, IL: Open Court, 2002). 
65 Morton, Autonomous op. cit., 149.
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Figure 4. Images B, C & D from GPS data for Worm.
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Object-Oriented Ontology (OOO) provides a radical re-figuring of the art object. OOO 
claims that an object withdraws from access. As Morton states: 'This means that its very 
own parts can't access it. Since an object's parts can't fully express the object, the object 
is not reducible to its parts. OOO is anti-reductionist. But OOO is also anti-holist. An 
object can't be reduced to its “whole” either, “reduced upwards” as it were. The whole is 
not greater than the sum of its parts. So we have a strange irreductionist situation in 
which an object is reducible neither to its parts nor to its whole.'66 This anti-reductionist 
stance means that an object cannot be undermined. The withdrawn essence of an object 
cannot  be  accessed  through  any  attempt  of  undermining  an  object  wither  through 
thought  or  some  other  means.  As  Morton  explains,  by essence  is  meant  something 
different from essentialism: as essentialism 'depends upon some aspect of an object that 
OOO holds to be a mere appearance of that object, an appearance-for some object. This 
reduction to appearance holds even if that object for which the appearance occurs is the 
object itself!'67 
OOO is also different to what Harman calls  overmining -  the claiming of priority or 
hierarchy of some objects over others;  in other words, that some are more real than 
others. The overminer insists that an object's existence consists in its relations with other 
objects; its relation to a more real entity. Or put another way, the overminer insists the 
realness of  an object  consists  in its  qualitative apprehension; its  measurement.68 The 
uncomfortable staging of an event in the early days of Worm became subsumed in the 
retracing  of  something  ,  its  measurement,  its  documentation  and  its  past.  This 
organising, conceptualising impulse is a near-redundant remapping of objects because 
the  real  breaches,  awesomely  immune  to  our  measuring  devices.  For  Worm,  I  was 
66 Ibid., 150. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Graham Harman, The Quadruple Object (London: Zero Books, 2011), 10-12. 
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interested in the possibility of an ongoing process of mapping; a process where I could 
rub out and redraw lines as I went. 
CHICKEN & WORM: MAPPING
I have already spoken about the process of mapping in relation to tracing a journey, and 
providing a document of the past. However, I would now like to expand on my context 
for  the use of  this  phrase.  I  understand  the  process  of  mapping as  being at  once a 
creative, utilitarian, and political act. Further to this, mapping is also personal and tactile 
in its indexical nature. For example, in the tracing of a map or the marking out of an 
idea, there are gaps between the marks where there exists a realm of bodily deliberation. 
This is shown in the residue - the footprints, scars, and echos. This reminds me of what 
in 1952, French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty,  had to say of the wavering and 
wandering  of  Matisse’s  hand  as  it  was  revealed  in  a  section  of  slow-motion  film 
footage. He wrote of the necessity of attending to ‘the threads of silence that speech is 
mixed together with.’69 Here, Merleau-Ponty draws our attention to the drawing process, 
and specifically of what  happens in the temporal  gaps between strokes  -  the breath 
marks between statements. Silences make up the process of sounds, and give time to 
invite  new ideas.  My process  during  Worm of  recording sounds  was  staggered  and 
reflected upon between bursts of documentation - and the material listened to repeatedly 
to find its  place within the work.  Artist  William  Kentridge describes  his method of 
drawing  and  walking  back  and  forth  from the  page  as  allowing  for  what  he  calls 
'fortuna' - a contingent and transformative agency that guides him from one sequence to 
the next, enabling the development of visual ideas that were not (and perhaps could not 
69 Maurice Merleau-Ponty: ‘Indirect Languages and the Voices of Silence’, in Galen Johnson (ed.), The 
Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1993), 83–4. 
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have been) planned in advance; it is ‘something other than cold statistical chance, and 
something too outside the range of rational control’.70 
This processing of the work and letting the mind wander is what made up the most 
meaningful time for me as an artist. In this way the journey becomes everything and the 
destination  disappears.  Quantitative  acts  of  filming and  recording   were  mixed  and 
reformed as the  roadtrip became open to the indeterminate.  As artist Henri Michaux 
describes his method: 'I wanted to draw the consciousness of existing and the flow of 
time. As onetakes one’s pulse. Or again, more modestly, that which appears when, in the 
evening, the film that has been exposed to the day’s images, but shorter and muted, is 
rerun. Cinematic drawing.'71 Just as they are concretions of time, each film that makes 
up Worm spreads out time in their own way. However, the presentation of these films, 
and also the the sonic materials that make up Chicken, are resistant to position and fixity 
in their modeling of an uncanny reality.72 
70 William Kentridge, ‘"Fortuna:" Neither Program nor Chance in the Making of Images.’ in Carolyn 
Christov-Bakargiev, Dan Cameron and J.M. Coetzee,William Kentridge (London 1999), 118–19. 
71  Henri Michaux, ‘To Draw the Flow of Time’ (1957), in Untitled Passages by Henri Michaux, 
Catherine de Zegher (ed.), trans. Richard Sieburth (New York: The Drawing Center, 2000),  7.
72  In the first issue of the surrealist journal La Révolution surréaliste, Max Morise wrote that 'stream of 
thought cannot be viewed statically' and that 'secondary attention necessarily distorts an image' - in 
other words, that the strangeness of an event or object is compromised by pictorial ratiocination. 
According to him,  'The images are surrealist, but not their expression.' Max Morise, 'Les Yeux 
enchantés,' in La Révolution surréaliste 1 (December 1, 1924), 27. 
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CONCLUSION
This commentary follows a map of what processes I have utilised and experienced to 
create my portfolio.  I  have tried to  establish an honest  account  of  my practice  and 
provide  my reflection  on  attempting  to  structure  creative  output  such  as  this.  This 
project has involved understanding what it is to make objects, and consciousness of a 
critical relation  to that experience. This has brought me to confrontations with failure, 
the uncanny, structures of time and space, and questions of self and objecthood. I hold it 
to be true that art can function as a means to think through difficult ideas and this body 
of writing further argues for the relevance of a reflective sonic practice. I have tried to 
remind the reader that we exist on the inside of something very big, and that this is very 
unsettling. I also hold it to be true that if one figures the world as 'an immense museum 
of strangeness,' art will follow graciously and abundantly. This work is a small trace of 
that. 
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